Introduction
In April 2007 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights ('the Court') advised Natallie Evans that the rules governing assisted reproduction in the United Kingdom (UK) were compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights ('the Convention' or ECHR).
1 For Evans this meant that all hope of having a child who would be genetically related to her was extinguished; for Evans' ex-fiance¤ , who had triggered the case by refusing consent to the use or continued storage of the embryos, it was a guarantee that he was not going to be made a father against his wishes; and for the UK government it was a sign that its pioneering legislation, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, 2 was human-rights worthy. Eighteen months later, the government fared less well in Strasbourg. This time, in a case concerning the indefinite retention, without consent, of the fingerprints and DNA samples and profiles of individuals who had been acquitted or whose cases had been discontinued, the Court held for the applicants, S and Marper, and against the UK government. 3 Five years earlier, in a case concerning disclosure of CCTV footage to the media, the Court had advised that 'private life', protected by Article 8 of the ECHR, was 'a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition'. 4 Another aspect of Article 8ç 'correspondence'çcame up in Copland v United Kingdom, 5 where the Court held that the collection and storage of personal information relating to the applicant's email and Internet usage raised issues concerning the right to respect for correspondence and private life. Complaints concerning the secret surveillance regime applicable in the UK have also come before the Court in recent years, 6 continuing a trend that dates back to 1984 and the case of Malone v United Kingdom.
7
That gives us a tally of six cases with a link to new technologies in less than seven years. Is that in some way significant? A cluster of cases can signal a trend, and it can also have a profound impact. Think, for example, of Soobramoney, 8 Grootboom 9 and Treatment Action Campaign, 10 a trio of decisions by the South African Constitutional Court, which ignited new thinking on the justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights. Equally, however, it would be foolish to think of case law as a context where quantity is always a signpost of something significant. Still, the Strasbourg clusterçEvans v United Kingdom, 11 S and Marper, 12 Peck, 13 Copland, 14 Liberty and Others 15 and if in so doing we might obscure some aspect of the rights^technologies' relationship. We were, for instance, conscious that human rights have the capacity to alter, delay or stop-dead a technology whilst it is still in research and development (R&D). 21 At the blue skies stage, too, human rights can have an effect: think, for example, of the difference that respect for the freedom required for scientific researchçindeed, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights describes that freedom as 'indispensable' for scientific research. 22 Human rights also have the capacity to 'reinvent' innovation. By this we mean that rights can shape perspectives on the needs, benefits and priorities that drive innovation in the first place. Rights can also shape who innovates: there is evidence that they are part of claims-making by individuals and families who are 'genetically at risk' and want to be part of R&Dçto be part, in other words, of new kinds of research endeavours, where they contribute actively to knowledge about their genetic illness, rather than being merely the recipients, non-recipients or, indeed, the opponents of science and technology. 23 If we turn to extant 'new technologies', further problems come to light. In particular, new applications of extant technologiesçwhether unexpected or striven-for, and whether market, user or mixed-innovationçcan be the cause of new human rights controversy, new acceptability or both. Side-effects, misconduct and accidents tend to have profound effects too. 24 Even the potential for new applications, however remote, however implausibleçwhat we might call 'fiction science'çcan have profound effects. Consider for example how Dolly the sheep, the first successful attempt at cloning a mammal by means of nuclear transfer technology, provoked an outpouring of imagined applications and how these in turn must surely have played a part in the burst of law-making around human cloning that followed soon after.
Put succinctly, we did not look forçand did not useça definition of 'new technologies'. We did however have 155 keywords which, in turn, provided a set of search parameters stretching across five broad categories. Those categories were as follows: (i) direct references to technology or its substrate (for example, 'hard drive' and 'data'); 25 (ii) affixes (for example, 'bio'); Digital; Database þ personal; Electronic archive; Electronic mail; Electronic tag; Enzyme; Genetic þ modified/test; Genomic; GPS; Hard disk; Human tissue; Implant; Forensic þ fibre/ DNA; Internet; Laboratory; Laser; Medical equipment; Microchip; Machine þ privacy; Mast; Monitor; Nanotechnology; Nuclear; Neuronal; Pace-maker; Plasmid; Radar; Scanner; Surveillance þ systems; Tazer; Transplant; and Ultrasound. 26 Also Micro-; Macro-; Cyber-; Auto-; Techno-; and E-(as, for example, in e-commerce).
(iii) techno-vocabulary (for example,'false-positives'); 27 (iv) the titles of relevant Council of Europe treaties (for example, the European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 1997), as well as titles and keywords from a range of other instruments; 28 and (v) principles which the Strasbourg Court might reasonably be expected to invoke in cases concerning new technologies (for example, the principle of respect for human dignity). 29 This article reports on what we found in the Court's case law using the above search method. It reports, too, on what we did not find. The structure is as follows: Section 3 explains why we embarked on the study, and Sections 4 and 5 report the findingsçSection 4 deals with what we did not find, and Section 5 describes and discusses what is in the case law. The final point to note is that, throughout the article, keywords used during the search are highlighted in bold. This has been done in order to facilitate ease of reference by readers.
A Fool's Errand?
Already, some readers will have determined that a hypothesis about new technologies and the European Court of Human Rights is one thing but pursuing 27 30 And, where it is recognised, human rights often seems to share the ground (and potentially compete) with bioethics. There have also been difficult relationships between human rights and both intellectual property and trade law, as well as differences of opinion between activists and scholars aligned with the access to knowledge (A2K) movement and their counterparts in the human rights one (especially on the question of the state's role).
31
A second problem is Europe: specifically, if what interests us is 'who' or 'what' within Europe is influencing the emerging field of law, rights and technology, it is not obvious that the Strasbourg Court has the best claim. So, for example, the Oviedo Convention and its Protocols, and the Data Protection Convention, 32 facilitate claims-making by the Court's parent organisation, the Council of Europe. Another contender would be the European Patent Office (EPO), which administers the European Patent Conventionçan instrument that provides that patents will not be granted for inventions the exploitation of which would be contrary to ordre public or morality. 33 Perhaps, however, the strongest case is that of the European Union (EU). Consider the evidence: the EU has signed up to public engagement with science; 34 40 would seem to indicate that the EU both sees itself and wants to be seen as an actor in the international human rights field. 41 The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, now part of the primary law of the EU, corroborates this point; it also corroborates the original claimçnamely, that the EU has a good case to be seen as the foremost European actor in the field of 'new technologies and human rights'çin that it establishes data protection as an autonomous fundamental right, a move that makes it stand out amongst human rights instruments (including the ECHR) 'which, for the most part, treat the protection of personal data as an extension of the right to privacy'.
42
To complete the sceptics' list, the Strasbourg Court has to be brought into the discussion. The sceptics' positionçmaintained in the face of a growing body of scholarship on the Court 43 çis that this Court is not suitable as a study site. Typically, the criticisms go as follows: why spend time studying a court whose decisions do not appear to build towards a system of judicially-constructed rules? Also, does not the margin of appreciation, and the Court's practice of balancing conflicting rights against each other or against competing public interests, 44 get in the way of the ECHR being an 'instrument of European public order for the protection of individual human beings'? 45 Finally, in light of the fact that our subject-matter is 'new technologies and human rights', the sceptics may also say that the Convention is not the obvious starting-point in that it contains mostly civil and 39 56 There has also been acknowledgement of both the 'increasing relevance' and 'continued neglect' 57 of the right to enjoy the benefit of scientific progress and its applications.
58
The question that arises is: has this flurry of law-and policy-making eased or, indeed, melted away the frictionçthe mix of hope, hype and fearçreferred to earlier? In short, no, it has not. Numerous tough questions lie ahead, such as ' [d] oes intellectual property deserve to be treated as a fundamental right? And if it does, how does a human rights-inspired conception of intellectual property differ from existing rules that promote innovation and creativity?' 59 Moreover, some of the voices raised in answer to these questions will take the view that law-making (and perhaps especially law-making in the name To sum up: a cluster of cases led us to formulate a hypothesis and, for four reasons, investigating it seemed a good course of action. First, the UK, the jurisdiction in which we are based, was involved in all six of the original cases. Second, the UK is certainly keen on techno-innovation but it is not alone in that: other European states and the EU have this trait as well, and Europeans are both subject to and consumers of new technologies. Third, although other European actors may seem more obvious starting-points for a study on new technologies and human rights, the ECHR and the Strasbourg Court are clearly the focal points for human rights at the European level. Also, Convention jurisprudence is a powerful force, both in contracting parties and internationally. Fourth, and finally, the relationship between human rights and new technologies is one that needs to be studied, not least because there is nothing clear-cut about either the role of human rights in regulating such technologies or the impact on human rights of a take-up of technologies (including by human rights advocates themselves). The Oviedo Convention is a treaty of the Council of Europe that sets out the fundamental principles applicable in day-to-day medicine as well as those applicable to new technologies in human biology and medicine. We had hoped that by using the Convention's title as a keyword we would have a series of high-quality hits, not least because of the Court's practice of referring to other international treaties, and even soft law, when interpreting the ECHR.
What We Did Not Find
61 Those hopes were not realised: to date, the Oviedo Convention has only been referred to as a relevant international legal source in the limited context of informed consent to medical interventions, 62 and there is also only one mention of any of its Additional Protocols. 63 The only other Council of Europe instruments from our keyword list that appeared in technology-centred cases were the Data Protection Convention and those relating to television broadcasting.
64
Ranging more widely, just one of the UNESCO triumvirate has been referred to by the Court, 65 and we found no references at all to the UN Declaration on Human Cloning, or to the principles of benefit-sharing, the common heritage of mankind (bar a brief mention in a dissenting opinion) 66 or the self-determination of peoples.
67 Meanwhile, access to information drew mixed results: on the one hand, nothing under Article 10 68 but, on the other hand, acknowledgement of the importance of securing such access in the environmental realm and, crucially, the crafting of a positive obligation to support this.
69
On the interaction among bioethics, medical ethics and law, we found too little to allow for a characterisation of the Court's view. The Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (UDBHR), which was adopted in 2005, has been referred to in just two cases, IG, MK and RH v Slovakia 70 and Evans v United Kingdom. 71 In each, the focus was on consent and it was Article 6 of the UDBHR, which deals with this issue, to which the Court made reference. The Court has used the term 'bioethics' on just three other occasions: in each instance the reference was to the work of the Council of Europe Steering Committee on Bioethics and its predecessor, the ad hoc committee of experts on progress in the biomedical sciences. 72 76 From a 'new technologies' angle, however, there is little in the Court's case law: there is just one reference, and it is in a partly dissenting opinionçan opinion by Judge Marcus-Helmons in the case of Cyprus v Turkey.
77 Noting that 'the rapid evolution of biomedical techniques' meant that 'new threats to human dignity may arise', Judge Marcus-Helmons alluded to the Oviedo Convention as an instrument that 'seeks to cover some of those dangers'. He went on to note two problems with this Convention: first, 'only a limited number of States have signed it' and, second, it only affords the European Court of Human Rights consultative jurisdiction. He therefore suggested that:
[i]n order [for] this ''fourth generation of human rights'' to be taken into account so that human dignity is protected against possible abuse by scientific progress, the Court could issue a reminder that under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights the States undertook to protect everyone's right to life by law. The precautionary principle was another keyword that proved disappointing. This principle emerged first in the environmental arena but lately it has migrated, including to both the public health field 79 and the biotechnology one. 80 We expected a cluster of technology-centred cases making reference to it: we met with mixed resultsçof the six cases found, only three related in any way to technology 81 while the remaining three dealt with child welfare or adoption. 82 We do want to say a little about one of the adoption cases thrown up by the search, Frette¤ v France.
83 This decision has attracted heavy criticism and, recently, in EB v France, 84 the Grand Chamber opted for a very different approach in a case with similar (though not identical) facts. In Frette¤ , the Court, in a 4-3 decision, held that the refusal to grant an authorisation to adopt to Philippe Frette¤ , a single gay man, did not violate his Convention rights. In reaching its decision, the majority accepted the argument of the French government to the effect that there was no consensus in the scientific community on the possible consequences of a child being adopted by one or more homosexual parents. That lack of consensus meant, they said, that in this area a broad margin of appreciation had to be left to states.
85
The precautionary principle gets an explicit mention in the case: Judge Costa, in a partly concurring opinion, suggests that 'most of the majority have based their decision, without saying so, on the precautionary principle.' 86 For many, however, the majority's approach towards scientific uncertainty was unacceptable; it was being used, they said, to undermine the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. One commentator proposed that the Court 'should be using the proportionality principle to 79 and Balmer-Schafroth and Others v Switzerland 92 çexamined the risks of pollution from either mining or nuclear power technologies. As we explain a little later, the Court sees both pollution and environmental hazards more generally as matters that fall within its remit. We explain, too, that it has imposed positive 'environmental' obligations on states under both Article 2 (right to life) and Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life and home). These are, moreover, obligations of considerable substanceçrequiring states not just to have laws and regulations designed to control severe environmental hazards (including from dangerous industrial or technological activities, whether public or private), but to pursue effective enforcement of those laws. 93 States are also subject to obligations concerning participation and access (to justice and to information). 94 Together, this range of obligations conjures a Court that might be inclined towards the precautionary principle: the experience in practice, however, has not been so clear-cutçnot least because in cases involving environmental issues the Court accords a wide margin of appreciation to the state.
95
In Balmer-Schafroth the Grand Chamber considered the danger posed to the applicants by a nearby nuclear power plant, holding that the applicants had failed to establish a direct link between the operating of the power station and their right under Article 8 to protection of their physical integrity. The majority emphasised that an alleged personal danger should be 'serious but also specific and, above all, imminent' 96 before a violation could be considered.
This stance came in for criticism in the dissenting opinion, led by Judge Pettiti and joined by seven colleagues:
The majority appear to have ignored the whole trend of international institutions and public international law towards protecting persons and heritage, as evident in European Union and Council of Europe instruments on the environment, the Rio agreements, UNESCO instruments, the development of the precautionary principle and the principle of conservation of the common heritage.
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More recently, in Tafl tar, 98 where the extraction processes of a gold-mining company used sodium cyanide, known for its toxicity, and operations were allowed to continue in the wake of an accident after which pollution, in excess of authorised norms, was detected near the applicants' home, the Court made explicit use of the precautionary principle. It noted the 'evolution of [this] philosophical principle to a legal standard' 99 in European law and also how it had been formulated in the case law of the European Court of Justice. It also noted, inter alia, both the Aarhus Convention and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. 100 Turning to the facts of the case, it observed that the presence of a serious and material risk to human health and well-being imposed an obligation on the state to assess risks, at the permit stage and after the accident, and to take appropriate measures. The Court noted that a preliminary impact assessment had indicated that there were risks involved in the mining process but that the authorities had failed to lay down operating conditions that would preclude the risk of serious harm. Moreover, even after the accident took place, the authorities did not intervene to stop the process. This was, the Court said, in breach of the 95 precautionary principle. Finding a violation of Article 8, the Court concluded that the authorities failed in their obligation to assess, to a satisfactory degree, the potential risks of the mining activities, and to take appropriate measures so as to protect the rights of those concerned to respect for their private lives and homes. 101 To close this section of the article we want briefly to look at intellectual property rights. New technologies are often attached to legal rights such as patents, and are closely linked to trademarks and copyright: as a result, we anticipated cases dealing with the state's duty to protect an individual's interests through legislation, preventive measures or provision of a remedy. Coming up with a keyword to capture intellectual property rights was not easy, however. Initially we used protection of the moral and material interests resulting from one's scientific productions and, when this failed to give us any cases, we opted for a further search using terms that feature in General Comment 17 of the Committee on ESCR.
102 Again, there were no hitsçapart from 'intellectual property'. 103 The latter term did, however, reveal that the Convention institutions have been called upon to rule on questions of intellectual property only very rarely. It also revealed a couple of points of substance. First, rights such as trademarks, 104 copyrights, 105 patents, 106 and the use of an Internet domain name 107 have been considered by the Court and Commission to constitute 'possessions' for the purposes of Article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention. 108 Second, as regards the relationship between the Convention and the European Patent Convention (and the EPO, which administers the latter instrument), in the Heinz case the Commission indicated that 'the transfer of powers to an international organisation is not incompatible with the [ECHR] provided that within that organisation fundamental rights will receive an equivalent protection'. 109 This presumption of equivalence has been confirmed by the Grand Chamber, 110 and subsequently held sway in Rambus Inc v Germany, a case which dealt with a private company's European patent in the area of chip technology. It was however noted that the presumption:
could be rebutted, if in the circumstances of a particular case, it was considered that the protection of Convention rights was manifestly deficient . . . [I]n such a case, the interest of international cooperation would be outweighed by the Convention's role as a ''constitutional instrument of European public order in the field of human rights''. 
What We Found
A great deal of what we did find emerged from the case law on one Article: Article 8, which provides a qualified or non-absolute right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence. Our findings are reported below. First, however, we look at how the Court has described 'new technologies', and the advice it has given to contracting parties vis-a' -vis its concerns about such technologies. In Saunders v United Kingdom,'our modern societies' were described, in a dissenting opinion, as 'information societies'. 114 The opinion goes on to note that 'all of us, government agencies as well as citizens, to a large extent depend on various kinds of information' and that it is therefore ' [n] o wonder that fraud in multiple forms is the bane of our societies': such frauds are, it said, 'all the more tempting since our computerised world with its manifold cryptographic In its judgment in S and Marper, the Court accepted that 'the fight against crime'çespecially against organised crime and terrorismç'depends to a great extent on the use of modern scientific techniques of investigation and identification', 117 in particular techniques of DNA analysis. This, it said, was 'beyond dispute'.
118 Earlier in Peck v United Kingdom, the Court had acknowledged the usefulness of CCTV in tackling crime, 119 and it has also accepted that the use of secret measures of surveillanceçto intercept mail, telephone and email communicationsçmay be necessary in a democratic society.
120 But in a departure from its standard practice, and in recognition of 'the particular features of secret surveillance measures and the importance of ensuring effective control and supervision of them', 121 the Court has been willing to allow general challenges to legislative regimes and practices governing this area.
122 The Court's position is that the mere existence of legislation which allows secret monitoring of communications creates a surveillance threat for all those to whom the legislation might be applied. The Court has also been rigorous in its application of the 'in accordance with the law' requirement in this field. 123 Our search suggests that references to the pace of change have occurred most often in the case law on Article 8. In S and Marper, for example, the Court noted the 'rapid pace of developments in the field of genetics and information technology' and said that it could not 'discount the possibility that in the future the private-life interests bound up with genetic information may be adversely affected in novel ways or in a manner which cannot be anticipated 115 127 Furthermore, as far back as 1984, Judge Pettiti in a concurring opinion in Malone v UK noted that the Convention 'protects the community of men' and that 'man in our times has a need to preserve his identity, to refuse the total transparency of society, to maintain the privacy of his personality'. 128 Invoking the Court's role as 'guardian of the Convention', he emphasised that one of the ways in which the Court fulfils this role is 'by investing Article 8 with its full dimension and by limiting the margin of appreciation especially in those areas where the individual is more and more vulnerable as a result of modern technology'. 129 He spoke of the role of others too, describing the 'mission' of the Council of Europe and its organs as being 'to prevent the establishment of systems and methods that would allow ''Big Brother'' to become master of the citizen's private life'.
130
The right to freedom of expression, protected by Article 10, is one of the things that keeps 'Big Brother' at bay, and, as the Convention institutions have emphasised, this freedom has other benefits as well. For example, in HUH v Switzerland the Commission described freedom of opinion as a necessity in a democratic society 'in that it can make the authorities and science discover problems of public health'. 131 Later in Hertel v Switzerland, in describing health dangers posed by microwave ovens as 'a sphere in which it is unlikely that any certainty exists', the Court emphasised that 'it would be particularly unreasonable to restrict freedom of expression only to generally accepted ideas'. 132 The general point arising from Hertel is that where commercial expression relates to a matter of public interest, the Court adopts a more stringent level of review than is the norm in commercial expression casesçput differently, the state's margin of appreciation is not so wide when commercial expression relates to a matter of public interest. 133 We shall be returning to the margin of appreciation in our discussion of Article 8 case law. Here, however, it is worth noting that the Court's use of this doctrine tends to make identification of general trends both difficult and dangerous. Our terrainçcases concerning new technologiesçis distinctly treacherous. We have already mentioned that in cases on environmental issues the Court grants a wide margin of appreciation to the state. And shortly we shall see that another standard trigger is the absence of consensus within the member states of the Council of Europe,'either as to the relative importance of the interest at stake or as to the best means of protecting it, particularly where the case raises sensitive moral or ethical issues'. 134 Still, we need to hazard some pointers. In so doing we shall focus on signals for domestic authorities, starting with Tavli v Turkey 135 where there was advice for domestic courts facing the challenges of 'our modern societies'. Tavli concerned an applicant who wanted to use newly-available DNA evidence in order to disclaim paternity but was refused a rehearing on the ground that 'scientific progress' was not a condition for retrial under the state's code of civil procedure. In finding a violation of Article 8, 136 the Court advised the domestic courts that they should be interpreting the existing legislation 'in light of scientific progress and the social repercussions that follow'. 137 The case of KU v Finland 138 suggests that awareness of scientific progress and its social repercussions is also a prerequisite for legislators. This case arose as a result of an advert of a sexual nature about the applicant on an Internet dating site. At the time of the posting, the applicant was only 12 years old. The advert gave his age, year of birth and a description of his physical characteristics, as well as a link to his web page where his picture could be found, and it said that he was looking for an intimate relationship with another boy, of his own age or older, 'to show him the way'. The applicant only became aware of the posting when he received an email from a man, offering to meet him. Under the law in Finland, at the time, the Internet provider could not be required to provide details of the identity of the person who had posted the advert. The Court, in a unanimous judgment, held that the applicant's Article 8 right to respect for private life had been violated. It did note the difficulties of policing 'modern societies' and, linked to this, it acknowledged that the state's positive obligation under Article 8 to criminalise offences against the person, and to reinforce such criminalisation via effective investigation and prosecution, must not generate an impossible or disproportionate burden on legislators. It also noted the government's argument that any legislative failing needed to be seen 'in its social context at the time'. 139 But it went on to emphasise that, by 1999, when the incident took place:
[i]t was well-known that the Internet, precisely because of its anonymous character, could be used for criminal purposes. . . . Also the widespread problem of child sexual abuse had become well-known over the preceding decade. Therefore, it cannot be said that the respondent Government did not have the opportunity to put in place a system to protect child victims from being exposed as targets for paedophiliac approaches via the Internet.
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The Court made two points of interest with respect to freedom of expression, confidentiality and privacy. It noted, first, that although respect for the freedom of expression and privacy of service-users must be guaranteed, any such guarantees could not be absolute: they might have to give way in order, for example, to protect the rights and freedoms of others, or to prevent crime. An overriding requirement of confidentiality of Internet services was unacceptable and it was 'the task of the legislator to provide a framework for reconciling the various claims which compete for protection in this context'. Legislators will also want to note that in another area of new technologiesç medically assisted procreationçthe Court has made it clear that contracting states have no obligation under the Convention to permit such technologies.
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Should they choose to do so however, they will need to be alert to the 139 which concerned a national DNA databaseçspe-cifically, the indefinite retention, without consent, of the fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA profiles of persons who had been acquitted, or whose cases had been dropped. The Court did not consider the complaint under Article 14 but, in its discussion of Article 8(2), it made two points that are relevant here. First, it expressed concern about the risk of stigmatisation, 'stemming from the fact that persons in the position of the applicants, who have not been convicted of any offence and are entitled to the presumption of innocence, are treated in the same way as convicted persons'. 146 Second, it endorsed the view of the UK-based Nuffield Council on Bioethics noting that, as applied, the retention policy had led to the over-representation in the database of 'young persons and ethnic minorities, who have not been convicted of any crime'.
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To round out this discussion of non-discrimination, we need to revert to ARTs; specifically, the sad case of Evans v United Kingdom.
148 Here six frozen embryos represented the applicant's only chance of becoming a genetic parent. These embryos had been created, using the applicant's eggs and the sperm of her then-fiance¤ , before she underwent cancer treatment which destroyed her fertility. Her (by now) ex-fiance¤ triggered the case when he refused consent to the use or continued storage of the embryos:
149 under the domestic law on ARTs, which placed consent at centre-stage, this meant that the embryos had to be destroyed. Evans challenged that law, complaining inter alia of discrimination contrary to Article 14 taken in conjunction with the rights to respect for private and family life under Article 8. She argued that the consent rules prevented her from ever becoming a parent 'in the genetic sense'. Moreover, they were discriminatory because they subjected her, an infertile woman, to a 'male veto', whereas a woman who could conceive without assistance could make reproductive decisions without reference to the genetic father.
mean that the state cannot interfere with married couples having children without assistance: a state programme of compulsory sterilisation or abortion would be a blatant violation of the ECHR. 144 Supra n. 62. 145 Supra n. 3. 146 Ibid. at para. 42. 147 Ibid. at para. 44. 148 Supra n. 11. 149 There was dispute as to whether the ex-fiance¤ 's action was to be characterised as a refusal of consent, or a withdrawal of it. The distinction had no impact on the Convention issues.
Four courts considered Evans' caseçthe High Court and Court of Appeal in England, and a Chamber and Grand Chamber of the Strasbourg Courtçand all four decided against her. 150 Although the Article 14 point was not discussed at Strasbourg, 151 the facts of the case are enough for us to be able to frame the overarching question: namely, is gender neutralityçthat is, equal treatment of women and mençthe appropriate way to regulate ARTs? 152 Evans demonstrates just how difficult a question that is. Relatedly, we might ask what place should be accorded to bright-line rules concerning consent in any ART regulatory regime? In short, is it either necessary or proportionate to 'permit of no exceptions in the provision of a veto on the use of embryos to either gamete provider'? 153 The Evans case comes up again later in our discussion of Article 8. Here though we need to mention another aspect of the case that will be of interest to national lawmakers: namely, when Article 2(1) says that '[e]veryone's right to life shall be protected by law', does 'everyone' encompass the human embryo? In Evans both the Chamber and Grand Chamber held that Article 2 was not violated by a rule that required the destruction of frozen embryos once consent to their use or continued storage had been withdrawn by one of the gamete donors. 154 This decision was not a surprise, however, given that in Vo v France the Grand Chamber had held that, 'in the absence of any European consensus on the scientific and legal definition of the beginning of life, the issue of when the right to life begins comes within the margin of appreciation which the Court generally considers that States should enjoy in this sphere'. 155 We turn finally to the most startling adviceçstartling both because it stems from the Court's 'greening of human rights law', 156 a move that could not have been guaranteed, and because the advice itself is so robust. ) where these are impairing Convention rights or might impair them, and they must enforce such regulations; states must also provide access to information on serious environmental risks (indeed, in some instances, they may have a duty to inform affected parties 159 ); and they must secure both public participation in environmental decision-making and access to justice in environmental cases.
Together, these obligations amount to 'undeniable progress' towards the 'opening up of an environmental horizon of human rights'. 160 More prosaically, they mean that our search had high-quality hits with a number of keywords: notably, public participation in decision-making, and linked to this access to information and access to justiceçterms that reflect the title of the Aarhus Convention. 161 The most interesting hit was Tas°k|n and Others v Turkey, a case under Article 8. Here an administrative authority had failed to comply with a judicial decision which had revoked the permit for a gold-mining operation because of its adverse effects on the environment. A secret decision by the authority, in violation of the court order, allowed production to continue at the mine. 162 The Strasbourg Court, finding a violation of Article 8, made two key points. First, there has to be effective enforcement of measures designed to protect rights; simply having the measures in place is not enough. 163 Second, states have a range of procedural duties; specifically, the Court held that:
whilst Article 8 contains no explicit procedural requirement, the decision-making process leading to measures of interference must be fair and such as to afford due respect to the interests of the individual as safeguarded by Article 8. EHRR 245 at para. 115, it was held that an obligation to take preventive measures applies, subject to certain conditions, when an individual's life is at risk 'from the criminal acts of another individual'. Note that in medical negligence cases it is the procedural obligation to investigate that applies, not the Osman obligation. 159 Guerra v Italy, supra n. 157. 160 Francioni, 'International Human Rights in an Environmental Horizon' , (2010) 50 European Journal of International Law 41 at 50. 161 Supra n. 51. On Aarhus, see, for example, Boisson de Chazournes, 'New Technologies, the Precautionary Principle, and Public Participation', in Murphy, supra n. 20 at 161. 162 Tas°k|n and Others, supra n. 94 at para. 120. 163 Ibid. at paras 124^5 noting that: 'Where administrative authorities refuse or fail to comply, or even delay doing so, the guarantees enjoyed by a litigant during the judicial phase of the proceedings are rendered devoid of purpose. ' 164 Ibid. at para. 118. This seems to be another way of saying that, to comply with Article 8, affected individuals must be able to participate in the decision-making process. The Court also spells out steps that should be taken by states where 'complex issues of environmental and economic policy' have to be determined: 'the decision-making process must firstly involve appropriate investigations and studies in order to allow them to predict and evaluate in advance the effects of those activities which might damage the environment and infringe individuals' rights and to enable them to strike a fair balance between the various conflicting interests at stake'. 165 And the Court did not stop there: it deepened its 'greening of human rights law' with two further requirements: first, information concerning environmental risks must be available to those who are likely to be affected, and second such individuals 'must also be able to appeal to the courts, against any decision, act or omission where they consider that their interests or their comments have not been given sufficient weight in the decision-making process'. 166 How to sum up? Well, put shortly, with just one caseçTas°k|nçthe Court has shown its own capacity for innovation and assigned a considerable amount of ongoing human rights work to the contracting parties.
B. Article 8 of the Convention
We turn finally to Article 8 which recurred again and again in our search, providing more direct hits than any other Article in the Convention. That did not surprise us: for starters, Article 8 encompasses a wide range of interestsç namely, 'private and family life, home and correspondence'. Secondly, the Court has favoured an expansive approach to those interests, not least when faced with evidence of technological change and the social repercussions that follow. Thirdly, this expansiveness has been reinforced by the Court's insistence that this Article, which speaks of 'the right to respect' for private and family life, home and correspondence, places not just negative obligations on the contracting states but positive ones too. 167 This in turn has meant that the Court has had to engage with the question of when the state, as part of those positive obligations, may need to limit other Convention rights in order to secure an Article 8 one. So, for example, in Von Hannover v Germany concerning the publication of photographs of a well-known public figure, the Court held that the state is under a positive obligation to protect individuals from invasion of their privacy by other individuals, and that this may necessitate measures limiting press freedom under Article 10. 168 Fourth and finally, the volume of cases on Article 8 has allowed the Court considerable scope to refine its approach towards the margin of appreciation and the fair balance principle, both of which arise not just in connection with the requirement under Article 8(2) that to be justified an interference must be, inter alia, 'necessary in a democratic society' but also in connection with the state's positive obligations under Article 8(1).
(i) Private and family life, home and correspondence
We begin by looking in turn at the four interests protected by Article 8(1)ç namely, 'private and family life, home and correspondence'.
Private life
As to 'private life', in Peck v United Kingdom, a case concerning disclosure of CCTV footage to the media (which resulted in images of the applicant being published and broadcast widely), the Court advised that the term is a broad one,'not susceptible to exhaustive definition'. 169 Fortunately, the Court has provided some pointers:
170 here we concentrate on those activities and interests under 'private life' that have an obvious new technologies angle. 171 There are a number of these, including the decisions to have and not to have a child, which in turn include both the decision to become a parent 'in the genetic sense'
172 and the decision to use medically assisted procreation (where the state has chosen to legislate to allow such technologies).
173 Such decisions fall under 'private life' because they are central to the 'physical and psychological integrity of the person'. 174 'Integrity' has other technology-relevant aspects too:
so, for example, environmental hazardsçsuch as pollutionçare covered by 'private life' because they can affect the physical well-being of the person. 175 The Court has also made it clear that 'consent' is a pre-requisite if medical treatment is not to amount to a violation of the integrity of the person.
176
Private life is not, however, restricted to integrity. It also encompasses each of the following: identity; a 'zone' or space of privacy; and the collection, storage or use of personal information, including bio-information. 177 In what follows, we look briefly at each aspect in turn, starting with identity. The Court has said that 'private life' embraces 'multiple aspects of the person's physical and social identity'. 178 To pin down some of these, we can look to the majority judgment in SH and Others v Austria, 179 which provides a useful summary. It begins by reiterating the principle that respect for private life 'requires that everyone should be able to establish details of their identity as individual human beings'. 180 Such information has, it says, 'formative implications' 181 for an individual's personality. It goes on to note that, although not an absolute entitlement, obtaining information necessary to 'discover the truth concerning important aspects of one's personal identity, such as the identity of one's parents', 182 falls within respect for private life. So, for example, in Odie' vre v France, where the applicant challenged the practice of 'anonymous birth' and called for the state to disclose information concerning her genetic parents, the Grand Chamber accepted that her claim to know her personal history fell within Article 8(1), 183 noting that 'birth, and in particular the circumstances in which a child is born, forms part of a child's, and subsequently the adult's, private life guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention'. 184 The next dimension of private lifeçthe 'zone' or space of privacyçcan be dealt with pretty briefly. From a new technologies' perspective, there are just two points of note: first, as demonstrated by Von Hannover v Germany, 185 where publication of photographs of the applicant, a well-known figure, going about her daily life fell within 'private life', even public figures are entitled to a zone of privacy. Moreover, in order to protect the zone of privacy, states may have to adopt measures to protect a person's picture against abuse by others; states need, in other words, to do more than abstain from interfering in the zone of privacy.
186 Second, although complaints about environmental hazards, on the one hand, and secret surveillance on the other, proceed more often under other elements of Article 8, they have also succeeded under the 'zone of privacy' interest.
187
The final dimension of private life we want to look at concerns the collection, storage or use of personal information. This has come before the Court quite a bit; moreover, the Court's approach towards data protection has generally been very robust. Information about an individual's health, and ethnic identity have been described as 'important' elements of private life, 188 and the Court has endorsed the view that 'there can be little if anything, more private to the individual than the knowledge of his genetic makeup'. 189 Additionally, even if the collection of personal data can be justified, this does not guarantee that its use or retention will also be acceptable to the Court. 190 Indeed, the mere storage of data concerning an individual's private life may amount to an interference within the meaning of Article 8; 191 the Court has taken the view that 'the subsequent use of the stored information has no bearing on that finding'.
192 And, as noted in Rotaru v Romania, refusing to allow an opportunity for information relating to an individual's private life to be refuted may also amount to an interference under Article 8.
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To gain a better understanding of the Court's position we can look at S and Marper, 194 where the applicants complained that the indefinite retention of their fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA profiles on a national database constituted an unjustified interference with their right to respect for private life under Article 8. Neither applicant had been convicted of a crime (S, a minor, had been acquitted, and the charges against Marper had been dropped), and neither had consented to the indefinite retention of the data. In assessing whether the retention interfered with the applicants' rights, the Courtçin line with its previous practice 195 çopted for separate consideration of fingerprints on the one hand, and the samples and profiles on the other. It did this because, as it said, '[i]t is common ground that fingerprints do not contain as much information as either cellular samples or DNA profiles '. 196 As between the samples and the profiles, the Court noted that retention of the former raised more serious concerns. There were, the Court said, 'legitimate concerns about the conceivable use of cellular material in the future'; additionally, such samples were of a 'highly personal nature'and contained 'much sensitive information about an individual, including information about his or her health'. Concurring with a view expressed by Baroness Hale in the UK House of Lords, the Court also emphasised that cellular samples contain 'a unique genetic code of great relevance to both the individual and his relatives'. 197 As a result, their retention per se was to be regarded as an interference with the applicants' right to respect for their private lives.
Retention of their fingerprints, and DNA profiles, also constituted interferences under Article 8. As regards the latter, the Court rejected the state's arguments that such profiles are 'nothing more than a sequence of numbers . . . containing information of a purely objective and irrefutable character and . . . the identification of a subject only occurs in case of a match with another profile in the database'. It also rejected the argument that, because computer technology and expertise were needed to make the information intelligible, access to it would be limited. The Court took the view that the profiles' capacity to provide a means of identifying genetic relationships between individuals' was enough for their retention per se to be regarded as an interference with the right to private life of the individuals concerned. It went on to note that because such profiles allow states to make inferences as to ethnic origin, which are then used in police investigations, their retention is 'all the more sensitive and susceptible of affecting the right to private life '. 198 In assessing whether retention of the applicants' fingerprints constituted an interference under Article 8, the Court engaged in a review of its own case law. The UK government had sought to convince the Court that because fingerprints were neutral, objective and irrefutable, retaining them did not interfere with the applicants' rights. The Court agreed that fingerprints were both objective and irrefutable, but given that they contain 'unique information about the individual concerned allowing his or identification with precision in a wide range of circumstances', their retention without consent on a database was not to be regarded as either neutral or insignificant. It concluded that 'retention of fingerprints on the authorities' records in connection with an identified or identifiable individual may in itself give rise . . . to important private-life concerns ', 199 although it did accept that, as regards the question of justification, it might be necessary to distinguish between the collection, storage and use of fingerprints, on the one hand, and cellular samples and DNA profiles on the other.
Family life
We turn now from 'private life' to 'family life', the second interest protected by Article 8(1). Looking at this interest from a new technologies' angle, there is little to say bar the following. First, in those cases where the applicants, who were married couples, complained of an interference with Article 8 because of a specific prohibition on, or refusal of, access to ARTs (in circumstances where the state has made provision for the use of such technologies), the Court has made it clear that it is not just private life, but also family life, that incorporates the right to respect for the decision to become a genetic parent. So, for example, in Dickson v United Kingdom, which concerned the refusal of facilities for artificial insemination to the applicants, a prisoner and his wife, the Court found that Article 8 was in play because the refusal of these facilities concerned the applicants' private and family lives, both of which incorporate the right to respect for the decision to become a genetic parent. 200 It is important to note a second point, however: Article 8 does not safeguard 'the mere desire to found a family'. 201 The third and final point to be noted is that a biological link may not be enough to allow an applicant to claim a 'family life' interest. The Court looks for 'close personal ties', ties that demonstrate 198 'an emotional relationship between two beings and a desire to pursue that relationship', 202 and in M v The Netherlands, the Commission expressed the view that where a man had donated sperm only to enable a woman to become pregnant through artificial insemination, that alone did not give him a right to respect for family life with the child.
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Home and correspondence
The final two interests protected by Article 8(1) are 'home'and 'correspondence'. Our search threw up nothing with respect to 'home', bar two general points which could perhaps be pertinent in a new technologies' context: first, when a business or profession is conducted from a person's private residence it will be covered by the concept of 'home'; 204 and second, noise, emissions, smells or other similar forms of interference may amount to a breach of the right to respect for home if they prevent enjoyment of the amenities of home.
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'Correspondence' proved more fruitful: here our keywords secured a new technologies' hit as a result of Copland v United Kingdom, 206 one of the cluster of cases that first drew us towards this project. In Copland, the applicant's telephone, email and Internet usage had been monitored during her employment at a local college, a statutory body administered by the state. The applicant was never advised that such monitoring might take place; she therefore had a reasonable expectation as to the privacy of both her phone calls and her email and Internet usage. The Court unanimously found a violation of Article 8, noting that the collection and storage of personal information relating to the applicant through her use of the telephone, email and the Internet interfered with the right to respect for both correspondence and private life. The Court did accept that, on occasion, it might be legitimate for an employer to monitor and regulate employees' use of such devices, but provided no elaboration on the point.
(ii) Positive and negative obligations: the margin of appreciation and the fair balance principle
Of course, the finding that one or more of 'private and family life, home and correspondence' is in play does not mean that there has been a violation of the Convention. There are two reasons for this. There is, first, the question whether there is a positive obligation inherent in 'respect' for the relevant interest, requiring the state to take reasonable and appropriate measures to secure the rights protected by Article 8(1). And secondças made clear by Article 8(2) ça state may be able to justify an interference with Article 8(1) by showing that it is 'in accordance with law', in pursuit of a legitimate aim and 'necessary in a democratic society'. It is to these aspects of Article 8 that we now turn, focusing exclusively on decisions and dicta that draw out the new technologies' angle. Most of what we found concerns the question of proportionalityçspecifically, the fair balance principle and the doctrine of the margin of appreciation. 207 We begin, however, with some brief comments on the Article 8(2) requirement that any interference must be 'in accordance with the law' and also in pursuit of a legitimate aim.
In accordance with the law and in pursuit of a legitimate aim
We look first at the former requirement, where almost all of the case law we encountered concerned telephone tapping, secret surveillance and covert intelligence-gathering, and the Court's focus was the quality of the law in place, rather than the absence of law per se. We found relevant material in S and Marper too, the case concerning the DNA database. Noting that the approach applied in the surveillance context was 'as essential . . . in this context', 208 the Court went on to provide a summary of what it described as its 'well-established case-law' 209 on 'in accordance with law'. It indicated, first, that the requirement will only be met where two conditions are satisfiedçthe impugned measure must have some basis in domestic law and it must be compatible with the rule of law, i.e., it must be adequately accessible and foreseeable. Second, to meet these requirements, there must be both 'clear, detailed rules governing the scope and application of measures' and 'minimum safeguards' concerning, inter alia, 'duration, storage, usage, access of third parties, procedures for preserving the integrity and confidentiality of data and procedures for its destruction'. The intention, in short, is that there should be 'sufficient guarantees against the risk of abuse and arbitrariness'. 210 first is from S and Marper, wherein the Court accepted that the retention of fingerprints and DNA information 'pursues the legitimate purpose of the detection, and therefore, prevention of crime'. 211 The second is listed in the Council of Europe's Manual on Human Rights and the Environment: it states that one of the general principles applied in environmental cases under the ECHR is that 'protection of the environment may be a legitimate aim justifying interference with certain individual human rights', 212 including the right to property. The final example is Kennedy v United Kingdom, one of our original cluster of cases, wherein the Court reiterated that powers to instruct secret surveillance of citizens are only permitted under Article 8 'to the extent that they are strictly necessary for safeguarding democratic institutions'.
213
The fair balance principle and the margin of appreciation
We have already noted that states have both positive and negative obligations under Article 8. The Court's position is that 'the boundaries between [these obligations] do not lend themselves to precise definition'. 214 It has, however, indicated that '[t]he applicable principles are nonetheless similar. In particular, in both instances regard must be had to the fair balance which has to be struck between the competing interests; and in both contexts the State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation'. 215 For us, the question that arises is: what if anything in the Court's case law on fair balance and the margin of appreciation is pertinent to new technologies?
As regards the breadth of the margin of appreciation, Evans v United Kingdom, 216 which was handled as a case concerning the state's positive obliga-one (which was the outcome sought by her ex-fiance¤ ), are both 'particularly important facets'. Second, the margin will be wider where 'there is no consensus within the Member States of the Council of Europe, either as to the relative importance of the interest at stake or as to the best means of protecting it, particularly where the case raises sensitive moral or ethical issues'.
219 So, as we saw earlier, in Vo v France the Grand Chamber held that in the absence of any European consensus on the scientific and legal definition of the beginning of life, the issue of when the right to life begins comes within the margin of appreciation. 220 In Evans a wide margin was afforded to the state both because 'the use of IVF treatment gives rise to sensitive moral and ethical issues against a background of fast-moving medical and scientific developments' and because the case raised questions which 'touch on areas where there is no clear common ground amongst the Member States'.
221
A third factor affecting the breadth of the margin is whether the state has to strike a balance between competing private and public interests or Convention rights ('the fair balance principle'). 222 In both Evans and SH and Others, which concerned laws regulating ARTs, the Court noted this factor, emphasising that the state's wide margin in principle extends 'both to its decision to intervene in the area and, once having intervened, to the detailed rules it lays down in order to achieve a balance between the competing public and private interests'. 223 the use of technology as a crime-detection tool, any comparison with other contracting parties would be irrelevant. By contrast, in Evans, where the context was consent and ARTs, the Court endorsed a bright-line rule, noting that the relevant legislation was 'the culmination of an exceptionally detailed examination of the social, ethical and legal implications of developments in the field of human fertilisation and embryology, and the fruit of much reflection, consultation and debate'. 226 The absolute nature of the lawçthe fact that it could not be disapplied in any circumstanceçwas not, 'in itself, necessarily inconsistent with Article 8'. 227 Thus, citing both principle (specifically, 'respect for human dignity and free will, as well as a desire to ensure a fair balance between the parties to IVF treatment') and strong policy considerations (promoting 'legal certainty' and avoiding 'problems of arbitrariness and inconsistency' that would attach to a case-by-case approach), the Court chose to endorse the domestic law, finding that it neither upset the fair balance required by Article 8 nor exceeded the state's wide margin of appreciation. 
Conclusion
The Court has observed, on many occasions, that the Convention is to be seen 'a living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions'. 229 That, to us, seemed a good omen as we commenced our new technologies' search of the Court's case law. So, too, did the more prosaic fact that, as of 2009, the Court began communicating its interim measures via email. 230 But the key question remains: did our hypothesis stand up to scrutiny? Did we find enough to be able to say that the Strasbourg Court is helping to frame the field of new technologies and human rights (or, more broadly, that of law and technology)?
We put to one side the question of who, or what, might count as the benchmark against which to judge the Court's performance. We also put to one side the qualifiers that come as standard in any discussion of the Court. Those qualifiersçmost notably, the Court's focus on individual cases and, in particular, on the facts of each applicationçcertainly cannot be ignored; at the same time, however, there is a risk of becoming consumed by them. So, having cleared these preliminaries, where do we stand? Essentially as follows: it 226 Supra n. 11 at para. 88. would, first of all, be wrongçprematureçto take a chance on a characterisation of the Court's stance on new technologies. To quote the title of this article, the Court's decisions in this area are best seen as 'works in progress'; they give direction on individual complaints but taken together they do not allow for a full characterisation of the Court's stance. That said, we can say that in this area there is evidence of more general trendsçincluding the Court's expansive approach to the interests protected by Article 8, its development of positive obligations and its apparent lack of enthusiasm for Article 12. 231 We have also seen plenty of evidence of classic concerns playing out in new-technologies mode. Thus, secret measures of surveillance, and more generally the use of new technologies in the criminal justice sphere (notably DNA databases), have been subject to robust scrutiny. Moreover, now that the EU Charter of Fundamental Rightsçwhich features an autonomous right to data protectionçis part of the primary law of the Union, and the EU is to accede to the ECHR, we should expect that data protection will be a major concern for European institutions in the coming years. 232 We can expect, too, that there will be some states keen to clarify the position vis-a' -vis DNA databasesçspecifically, if human rights compliance is to be secure, who and what can be in the database, for how long and for what purpose? And, clearly as part of this, the Court is likely to be called upon to elaborate how precisely it views the difference between DNA samples and DNA profiles, and whether, for example, a population-wide database would be acceptable if it is just profiles that are retained.
Non-discrimination and protection of vulnerable groups are other classic concerns that seem to be engaging the Court's attention in this field: think, for example, of SH and Others v Austria, 233 and the references to both ethnic groups and minors in S and Marper v United Kingdom.
234 But, looking in particular at Evans v United Kingdom, 235 it is also clear that non-discrimination can be awfully difficult terrainçin Evans it involved a clash of rights, in the context of hope, fear and personal tragedy, and an apparent challenge to consent as the quintessential human rights-compliance measure. Another area needing fresh engagement is the obligations of wealthy, medically advanced European states towards citizens of poorer countries. Work has commenced on the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications, and as part of this there is likely to be new engagement with the obligation of international co-operation and assistance, and the effects of the current intellectual property regime. But that is not enough: as demonstrated by N v United Kingdom, 236 where the Court made it clear that Article 3 does not bar a contracting party from returning a seriously ill individual to her or his country of origin unless there are 'very exceptional circumstances' involving 'compelling humanitarian considerations', there is an urgent need for ongoing engagement with the complex question of our obligations towards both the nearby needy and their distant counterparts. 237 And, put bluntly, this is not something that European states and their citizens should be seeking to abdicate to the Strasbourg Court.
If we shift from the difficult to the unexplored, ethics (or more narrowly bioethics) seems to be the stand-out omission in the search results. We did not anticipate this gap: quite the oppositeçthe legacy of Nuremberg, the negotiation of the Oviedo Convention and, more generally, the rise of 'public bioethics', meant that we had been expecting material that would allow us to identify the Court's position on the relationship between bioethics and human rights. We had come across, but discounted, the advice given by representatives of the Court (in the context of Recommendation Rec(2003)10 of the Committee of Ministers concerning xenotransplantation) to the effect that the ECHR 'should be understood as a legal instrument aimed at securing individual rights and as such it may be of limited relevance to policy issues in the field of bioethics'. 238 If this is the 'official' stance, we would ask why and also for how long can it survive?
Still, the search threw up positives tooçmost obviously, the cluster of 'environmental' obligations stemming from Tas°k|n et al. The text of the ECHR does not exactly prompt one to think in terms of environmental rights, so it was genuinely interesting to see the Court's crafting of positive obligations from Articles 2 and 8. 239 The platform the Court has created for the principle of public participation is particularly welcomeçin part because of its ongoing reluctance to use Article 10 as the basis for a general right of access to information. On the precautionary principle, we did not find enough to say how it is likely to fare at Strasbourg; what we can say, however, is that the principle is now on the Court's radar. There is, moreover, a related point concerning lack of scientific consensus as a trigger for the margin of appreciation. We saw a 242 wherein the Court stepped away from another standard trigger and indicated a willingness to act in the absence of a 'common European approach' to the issue at hand, we might speculate that something similar could happen in this context too. That move is, as they say, 'one to watch'. On balance, we would say that the same advice is apt as regards the Court's role as an actor in the field of new technologies and human rights. Put differently, this is a Court that is engaged in 'works in progress'.
